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Abstract— Smart meters (SMs) measure and report users’
energy consumption to the utility provider (UP) in almost real-
time, providing a much more detailed depiction of the consumer’s
energy consumption compared to regular electricity meters. This
increased rate of information flow to the UP, together with its
many potential benefits, raise important concerns regarding user
privacy. In this work, privacy in a multi-user SM system is
studied from an information theoretic perspective, where the
privacy is measured by the mutual information between the
users’ real energy consumption profile and the SM readings that
are available to the UP. Assuming that the SM readings cannot
be tempered, privacy can be achieved thanks to the existence of
an alternative energy source (AES), which can provide energy to
the users with a given average power constraint. The privacy-
power function, which characterizes the minimal information
leakage rate that can be achieved for a given average AES
power constraint is introduced. When the energy demand of the
users is independent and identically distributed over time, the
privacy-power function is characterized in a single-letter form,
which can be numerically computed in the case of discrete input
loads. It is shown that the optimal privacy is achieved through
a memoryless stochastic energy management policy. Explicit
characterization of the privacy-power function is provided for
binary and exponentially distributed input loads. In the multi-
user scenario, when the users’ energy demands are independent
and exponentially distributed with different average values, the
optimal allocation of the AES energy is identified as the solution
of a reverse waterfilling algorithm, which typically allocates more
energy from the AES to the users with higher average energy
demand.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of smart meters (SMs) in energy dis-
tribution networks the utility providers (UPs) are able to
monitor the grid more closely, and predict the changes in
the demand more accurately. This, in turn, allows the UPs
to increase the efficiency and the reliability of the grid by
dynamically adjusting the energy generation and distribution,
as well as, the prices, thereby, also influencing the user
demand. Besides, SMs also benefit the users by allowing them
to monitor their own energy consumption profile in almost real
time. Consumers can use this information to cut unnecessary
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consumption, or to reduce the cost by dynamically shifting
consumption based on the prices dynamically set by the UPs.
Adoption of SMs is increasing rapidly [1]. In Europe, the
adoption of SMs has been mandated by a directive of the
European Parliament [2], which requires 80% SM adoption
in all European households by 2020 and 100% by 2022.
However, the massive deployment of SMs at homes have
also raised serious concerns regarding user privacy [3]. High
resolution SM readings can allow anyone who has access to
this data to infer valuable private information regarding user
behaviour, including the type of electrical equipments used,
the time, frequency and duration of usage [4], and even the
TV channel that is being watched, as reported in [5].
Several methods have been proposed to provide privacy
to SM users while keeping the benefits of providing SM
readings to the UP for control and monitoring of the grid.
In [6] user anonymization is proposed by the participation of
a trusted third party. Bohli et al. [7] proposes sending the
aggregated energy consumption of a group of users and in [8]
users protect their privacy by adding random noise to their
SM readings before reporting them to the UP. Similarly, [9]
proposed quantizing SM readings before reporting them to the
UP.
In all of the above work, the privacy is obtained by distort-
ing/transforming the SM readings before being forwarded to
the UP. However, given that the energy is provided to the user
by the UP, the UP can easily track user’s energy consumption
by installing its own smart measurement devices at points
where the user connects to the grid. It seems that no level
of privacy can be achieved under such a strong assumption;
however, users can conceal the patterns corresponding to
individual devices and usage patterns by manipulating their
energy consumption. This can be achieved either by filtering
the energy consumption over time by means of a storage
device, as considered in [10], [11], [12] and [13], or by
considering the availability of an alternative energy source
(AES) as in [13], [14]. An AES can model a connection to
a second energy grid, an electric car battery or a renewable
energy source, such as a solar panel.
In our model, we assume that the users can satisfy part
of their energy demand from the AES. While the UP can
track the energy it provides to the users perfectly, it does
not have access to the instantaneous values of the amount of
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leakage to the UP will be limited, and a certain level of privacy
will be achieved depending on the amount of power available
from the AES. Obviously, if the average power that AES can
provide is sufficient enough to satisfy all the energy demand
of the appliances, the privacy problem can be resolved in a
straightforward manner. However, in general, the AES will
be limited in terms of the average power it can support, and
as we show in this paper, how the user utilizes the energy
provided by the AES is critical from the privacy perspective.
We measure the privacy through the mutual information rate
between the user’s real energy consumption and the energy
provided by the UP (the SM readings). Mutual information has
previously been proposed as a measure of privacy in several
works [15]–[17] and in particular for SM systems in [9], [11]
and [13].
In our previous work [14], [18] we have characterized the
minimum information leakage rate in the case of a single user
with an average and peak power constrained AES. We have
shown that there is a very close connection with this problem
and the rate-distortion problem in lossy source compression
[19] albeit with significant differences. Here we generalize
our results to multiple users. In this scenario (see Fig. 1),
multiple users, each with its own independent energy demand,
share a single AES. We assume that there is one separate
SM for each user, and the privacy is measured by the total
information leaked to the UP about the users’ energy consump-
tion. A single energy management unit (EMU) receives users’
instantaneous energy demands and decides how much energy
to provide to each user from the AES, while satisfying the
average power constraint. We first introduce the privacy-power
function which characterizes the minimal information leakage
rate to the UP for a given AES average power constraint.
We then provide a single-letter information theoretic char-
acterization of the privacy-power function for the multi-user
scenario when the input loads are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. While the EMU can
employ energy management policies with memory in general,
our result shows that a memoryless energy management policy
which randomly requests energy from the AES is optimal,
significantly simplifying the implementation.
We consider both discrete and continuous input loads. For
discrete input load distributions, we first show that the optimal
output alphabet can be limited to the input alphabet without
loss of optimality, which allows us to write the privacy-power
function as the solution of a convex optimization problem
with linear constraints. As a result, the privacy-power function
with discrete input loads can be evaluated numerically in
polynomial time. We also provide a closed-form expression for
the privacy-power function when the input loads are indepen-
dent and binary distributed. Using numerical optimization, we
compare the optimal privacy-power function with two heuristic
power allocation schemes in order to highlight the potential
privacy benefits. We consider a time-division scheme which,
at each time instant, obtains the requested energy either from
the grid or from the AES, but not from both simultaneously.
We also consider an output load limiting scheme which limits
the output load to a fixed maximum value in order to cover
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Fig. 1. Smart meter model studied in this paper. The EMU receives the
energy demand from multiple users, U1, . . . , UN , and decides how much
of the energy demand of each user should be provided from the AES.
The remainder of the energy demands are satisfied from the grid, which
is measured and reported by the SMs to the UP. The privacy is measured
through the information leakage rate, which measures how much information
the UP receives about the input load [X(1), . . . ,X(n)] by observing the SM
readings [Y(1), . . . ,Y(n)].
up any variation in the energy demand beyond this value. We
numerically show that our optimal scheme provides significant
privacy gains compared to these heuristic energy management
policies.
While the numerical evaluation of the privacy-power func-
tion for general continuous input load distributions is elusive,
we derive the Shannon lower bound (SLB) on the privacy-
power function, and show that this lower bound is tight when
the the users have independent exponentially distributed input
loads. For the latter case, we also show that the optimal
allocation of the energy generated by the AES among the
users can be obtained by the reverse waterfilling algorithm
[19]. In order to reduce the total information leakage rate,
AES resources are allocated to all the users, such that the users
with low average input load satisfy all their demand from the
AES, while the users with high average load receive the same
amount of energy from the grid.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the system model, and provide a single-letter
information theoretic characterization of the privacy-power
function when users have and i.i.d. energy demand over time.
Then we show that the privacy-power function for independent
users can be solved by simply minimizing the sum of the
individual privacy-power functions with a sum average power
constraint. The derivation of the privacy-power function for
discrete input loads and its particularization to binary input
loads is addressed in Section III. Then in Section IV the
privacy-power function for continuous input loads is studied
and particularized to the exponential distribution. Numerical
results are provided in Section V. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the discrete time SM model depicted in Fig.
1. We have N users connected to the energy grid. The energy
requested by user i at time instant t is denoted by Xi(t) ∈ Xi,
where Xi is the support set of the energy demand of user i.
We consider the availability of an AES in the system. The
AES can provide energy to the users at a maximum average
power of P . The AES reduces the energy requested from the
3grid; but the primary use of the AES here is to create privacy
against the UP and other third parties.
The energy flow in the system is managed by the EMU.
The EMU receives, at time t, the energy demands of all the
users, i.e., the vector X(t) = [X1(t), ..., XN (t)]. Part of the
energy demand of the users can be supported by the AES,
while the remainder is provided directly from the energy grid.
We denote by Yi(t) ∈ Yi, the amount of energy user i gets
from the grid at time t, or equivalently, the reading of SM i at
time t. We define Y(t) = [Y1(1), ..., YN (t)] as the aggregated
SM readings available to the UP at time t. The energy demand
of each user has to be satisfied fully at any time, that is, we
do not allow outages or delaying/shifting the user demand.
Moreover, we do not allow increasing privacy at the expense
of wasting energy, i.e., we have 0 ≤ Yi(t) ≤ Xi(t) for all t.
At the EMU, we consider energy management policies
which, at each time instant t, decide on the amount of power
that will be provided from the AES to each of the users based
on the input loads up to time t, Xt = [X(1), ...,X(t)], and
the output loads up to the previous time instant, Yt−1 =
[Y(1), ...,Y(t− 1)]. We allow stochastic energy management
policies, that is, the output load at time t, Y(t), can be a
random function of Xt and Yt−1. We assume that, while the
UP knows P , the average power generated by the AES, it does
not have access to the instantaneous values of the energy users
receive from the AES.
Definition 1: Denote the vector of input and output load
alphabets for all the users as XN = [X1, ...,XN ] and YN =
[Y1, ...,YN ], respectively. A length-n energy management
policy is composed of, possibly stochastic, power allocation
functions
ft : X
N × t × YN × (t−1) → YN , (1)
for t = 1, ..., n, such that
Y(t) = ft(X(1), . . . ,X(t),Y(1), . . . ,Y(t− 1)), (2)
with Xi(t) ≥ Yi(t) ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
We measure the privacy achieved by an n−length energy
management policy with the information leakage rate. As-
suming that the statistical behavior of the energy demand is
known by the UP, its initial uncertainty about the real energy
consumption can be measured by the entropy rate 1
n
H(Xn).
This uncertainty is reduced to 1
n
H(Xn|Yn) once the UP
observes the output load. Hence, the information leaked to
the UP can be measured by the reduction in the uncertainty,
or equivalently, by the mutual information rate between the
input and the output loads,
In ,
1
n
I (Xn;Yn) . (3)
Notice that if we could provide all the energy required by the
users from the AES, we could achieve perfect privacy, i.e., we
would have In = 0 for all n, by letting Yi(t) = 0 for all i
and t. However, in general the AES will be limited in terms
of the average power it can provide.
We are thus interested in characterizing the achievable level
of privacy as a function of the average power P that is
provided by the AES, given by
Pn = E
[
N∑
i=1
1
n
n∑
t=1
(Xi(t)− Yi(t))
]
, (4)
where the expectation is take over the joint probability distri-
bution of the input and output loads.
Definition 2: An information leakage rate - average power
pair (I, P ) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of
energy management policies of duration n with limn→∞ In ≤
I , and limn→∞ Pn ≤ P .
Definition 3: The information leakage rate - average power
region is the closure of the set of all achievable (I, P ) pairs.
Definition 4: The privacy-power function, I(P ), is the in-
fimum of the information leakage rates I such that (I, P ) is
achievable.
The privacy-power function characterizes the level of pri-
vacy that can be achieved by an average power limited AES.
The goal of the EMU is to achieve the minimum information
leakage rate by optimally allocating the limited energy from
the AES over the users and time.
This model of an AES is appropriate for energy sources with
their own large energy storage unit, which can provide energy
at a certain rate for a sufficiently long duration of time. A
peak power constraints on the AES in addition to the average
power constraint is also considered in [18]. On the other hand,
in [13] we have explicitly considered the energy generation
process at the AES, in which case the EMU is limited not
only by the average power it can pull from the AES, but
also the generated energy plus the energy available in the
battery at each time instant. These instantaneous constraints
that vary over time depending on the energy management
policy and the energy arrival process at the AES render the
analysis significantly harder as they prevent us from invoking
the information theoretic arguments that will be instrumental
in obtaining the single-letter results in this work.
Our goal is to give a mathematically tractable expression
for the privacy-power function, and identify the optimal energy
management policy that achieves it. In the rest of the paper, we
consider for simplicity i.i.d. input loads. In the next theorem,
we show that if the input load vectors X(t) are i.i.d. over time
with fX(x), we can characterize the function I(P ) in a single-
letter format. Note that the instantaneous energy demands of
the users can be correlated with each other.
Theorem 1: The privacy-power function I(P ) for an i.i.d.
input load vector X = [X1, . . . , XN ] with distribution fX(x)
is given by
I(P ) = inf
fY|X(y|x):E[
∑
N
i=1(Xi−Yi)]≤P,
0≤Yi≤Xi, i=1,..N
I(X;Y), (5)
where Y = [Y1, . . . , YN ] is the corresponding vector of SM
readings.
Some basic properties of the privacy-power function I(P )
are characterized in the following lemma. The proof follows
from standards techniques based on time-sharing arguments
[19].
Lemma 1: The privacy-power function I(P ), given above,
is a non-increasing convex function of P .
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Proof: We first prove the achievability. Given a con-
ditional probability distribution fY|X(y|x) that satisfies (5),
we generate each Y(t) independently using fY|X(y(t)|x(t)).
The mutual information leakage rate is then given by I(X;Y)
whereas the average power constraint in (5) is trivially satis-
fied.
For the converse, assume that there is an n−length energy
management policy that satisfies the instantaneous and average
constraints in (5). Let H(X) denote the entropy of the random
variable X. The information leakage rate of the resulting out-
put load vector will satisfy the following chain of inequalities:
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) =
1
n
[H(Xn)−H(Xn|Yn)] , (6a)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
H(X(t))−H(X(t)|Xt−1Yn)
]
,
(6b)
≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
[H(X(t)) −H(X(t)|Y(t))] , (6c)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(X(t);Y(t)), (6d)
≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
I
(
E
[
N∑
i=1
Xi(t)− Yi(t)
])
, (6e)
≥ I
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
E
[
N∑
i=1
Xi(t)− Yi(t)
])
, (6f)
≥ I(P ), (6g)
where (6b) follows from the assumption that the input loads
are i.i.d. over time, (6c) follows as conditioning reduces
entropy; (6e) follows from the definition of the privacy-power
function I(·); (6f) follows from the convexity of function I(·)
stated in Lemma 1 and Jensen’s inequality; and finally (6g)
follows since the energy management policy has to satisfy the
average power constraint and I(·) is a non-increasing function
of its argument.
Remark 1.1: The achievability part of the proof reveals that
the optimal energy management policy is memoryless; that
is, it can be achieved by simply looking at the instantaneous
input load, and generating the output load randomly using the
optimal conditional probability, which simplifies the operation
of the EMU significantly. This results in a stochastic energy
management policy rather than a deterministic one.
We note here that the same performance in Theorem 1
can also be achieved by a deterministic block-based energy
management policy if the user knew all the future energy
demands over a block of n time instants.
We also note here the similarity between the privacy-power
function in (5) and the classical rate-distortion function [19].
The characterization of the privacy-power function for a multi-
user SM system is equivalent to the rate-distortion function for
a vector source with a difference distortion measure
d(x,y) =
{ ∑N
i=1 xi − yi, if yi ≤ xi, ∀i
∞, otherwise. (7)
However, despite the similarity between the expressions of the
rate-distortion and the privacy-power functions, their opera-
tional definitions are quite different. In the case of lossy source
compression, there is an encoder and a decoder and the rate-
distortion function characterizes the minimum number of bits
per sample that the encoder should send to the decoder, such
that the decoder can reconstruct the source sequence within the
specified average distortion level. In lossy source compression,
the encoder observes the whole block of n source samples, and
maps them to an index from the compression codebook, which
is agreed upon in advance.
There are major differences between the two problems. In
the SM privacy problem, there is neither an agreed codebook
nor a digital interface. Here Yn is the direct output of the
“encoder”, rather than the reconstruction of the decoder based
on the transmitted index. The EMU does not operate over
blocks of input load realizations; instead, the output load
is decided instantaneously based on the previous input and
output loads. Similarly, in the SM privacy problem, there
is no encoder or decoder either, although the EMU can be
considered as an encoder and Yn as the reconstruction of the
input load Xn. However, the “distortion” constraint between
the input and output loads in the SM privacy problem stems
from the constraint on the available power that the AES can
generate, rather than the limited rate of encoding as in the rate
- distortion problem.
Having clarified the distinctions between the privacy-power
and rate-distortion functions, we also remark the differences
between our formulation of the SM privacy problem and the
privacy-utility framework studied in [9]. While in our privacy
model the SM readings are not tempered, and thus, report the
exact energy provided by the grid, in [9], the SM readings are
considered as the samples of an information source, which are
compressed before being forwarded to the UP in order to hide
their real values, and hence, create privacy at the expense of
distorting the SM measurements. The distortion constraint in
[9] is explicit and measures the utility of the compressed SM
samples.
If the users’ input loads are independent from each other, but
not necessarily identically distributed, the multi-user privacy-
power function in (5) simplifies further. The following chain
of inequalities lower bound the privacy-power function under
this assumption:
I(X;Y) =
N∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H
(
Xi|X
i−1, Y N
)
, (8a)
≥
N∑
i=1
H (Xi)−
N∑
i=1
H (Xi|Yi) , (8b)
=
N∑
i=1
I (Xi;Yi) , (8c)
≥
N∑
i=1
IXi (Pi) , (8d)
where we have defined Pi = E[Xi − Yi], and IXi(·) denotes
the privacy power function for a system with an input load
distribution fXi(xi). We can achieve equality in (8b) with
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i fYi|Xi(yi|xi). Consequently, we can achieve equality in
(8d) by using the single user optimal energy management
policy for each of the input loads separately, while satisfying
the total average power constraint,
∑N
i=1 Pi ≤ P .
Following the above arguments, the problem of character-
izing the optimal privacy-power function for a multi-user SM
system is reduced to the following optimization problem
I(P ) = inf∑
N
i=1 Pi≤P
N∑
i=1
IXi (Pi) . (9)
to study privacy in a SM system.
In the following sections, we use the information theoretic
single-letter characterization of the privacy-power function in
order to obtain either closed-form solutions or numerical al-
gorithms that give us the optimal energy management policies
in multi-user SM systems with certain input load distributions
and an average power constraint on the AES.
III. DISCRETE INPUT LOADS
In the previous section we have characterized the privacy-
power function for i.i.d. input loads as an optimization problem
in a single-letter format in (5). Now we will show that this
problem can always be efficiently solved for any discrete input
load distribution. In addition, for the particular case where
all the users have binary input loads, we give a closed-form
expression for the privacy-power function.
For discrete input and output alphabets, the characterization
of the privacy-power function I(P) in (5) is a convex opti-
mization problem since the mutual information is a convex
function of the conditional probabilities, fY|X(y|x), for y ∈
YN , x ∈ XN , and the constraints are linear. Then, (5) can
be solved numerically, e.g., by the efficient Blahut-Arimoto
(BA) algorithm [19]. However, while the input load alphabet,
defined by the system based on the energy demand profiles
of the users, can be discrete, the output load alphabet is not
necessarily discrete, and in general can take any real value. The
next theorem shows that for discrete input load alphabets, the
output load alphabet can be constrained to the input alphabet
Y = X without loss of optimally and consequently, for any
given discrete input alphabet the privacy-power function can
always be computed efficiently. This result is only valid for
i.i.d. input loads but does not require user’s input loads to be
independent from each other.
Theorem 2: Without loss of optimality, for discrete input
load alphabets, the output load alphabet YN can be constrained
to the input load alphabet, i.e., YN= XN .
Proof: Let the discrete input load alphabets for each user
be defined as a possibly infinite set
Xi = {xi,1, ..., xi,mi : xi,j < xi,j+1},
where mi = +∞ if the input alphabet is countably infinite.
Define XCi as the set of non-negative real numbers that are
not in the input load alphabet for each user i. Next, for any
vector x = [x1, ...., xN ] ∈ XN define the set
Ω (x) , (x−1 , x1]× · · · × (x
−
N , xN ]
where × denotes the Cartesian product and x−i =
{x ∈ {0,Xi} : x < xi}. Now assume that the optimal privacy-
power function in (5) is achieved by the conditional probability
distribution fY|X(y|x), which might take positive values for
some yi ∈ X
C
i . We define the following new conditional
probability distribution:
f
Yˆ|X(yˆ|x) =
{
0, if ∃i : yˆi ∈ XCi ,∫
Ω(yˆ)
fY|X(y|x)dy, if yˆi ∈ Xi, ∀i.
The new conditional probability function does not allow
any output value in XCi for any i, i.e., the output alphabet
is limited to the input alphabet. Instead, any output vector
Y = [y1, . . . , yN ], which has a non-zero probability according
to fY|X(y|x), is assigned to a new output vector [yˆ1, . . . , yˆN ]
such that
yˆi = min{x ∈ Xi : x ≥ yi}. (10)
Notice that the energy management policy, f
Yˆ|X(yˆ|x), is still
feasible since the output load, at any time instant, is still
less than what is requested by the appliances yˆi ≤ xi, ∀i.
Moreover, observe that with this new conditional distribution
the power load demanded from the AES can only have
a smaller average value compared to the original energy
management policy, since the output load is not reduced for
any input load value. Thus, it only remains to show that the
new conditional distribution leaks at most the same amount of
information to the UP. Notice that the new output load Yˆ is
a deterministic function of Y define in (10). Hence, from the
information processing inequality, we have that X −Y − Yˆ
form a Markov chain, and consequently, I(X,Y) ≥ I(X, Yˆ),
which completes the proof.
A. Binary Input Loads
The simplest discrete input load model we can consider
is a binary input alphabet with independent Bernoulli input
load distributions for all the users, i.e., Xi ∼ Ber(pi), where
pi = pXi(Li) and Xi = {Li, Hi} for i = 1, ..., N . Observe
that the average power required by the i−th user is given by
PXi = Li + ∆i (1− pi), where ∆i = Hi − Li. This power
consumption model corresponds to a scenario in which the
users, at each time instant, require either a constant high power
load level Hi, or a constant low power load level Li, i.e.,
the standby power consumption level. When there is a power
demand, the EMU fulfills this demand either obtaining the
energy from the UP, or from the AES according to pY|X.
From Theorem 2, the optimal output distribution Yi is also
binary for all i. Hence, the power allocated from the AES to
each user is a binary random variable over the set {0,∆i}.
Note that, since we require Yi ≤ Xi, we can only provide
energy from the AES to user i if Xi(t) = Hi and Yi(t) = Li,
and consequently, pXiYi(Li, Hi) = 0 and pXiYi(Li, Li) =
pXi(Li) = pi. The energy obtained from the AES is then
directly related to pXiYi(Hi, Li) by Pi = ∆ipXiYi(Hi, Li),
and we can express the mutual information I (Xi;Yi) for the
bivariate binary distribution
pXiYi =
[
pi 0
Pi
∆i
1− pi −
Pi
∆i
]
,
6as a function of Pi as follows:
IBi (Pi) =
Pi
∆i
log2
(
Pi
∆i
)
−
(
pi +
Pi
∆i
)
log2
(
pi +
Pi
∆i
)
− (1− pi) log2 (1− pi) .
Observe that IBi (Pi) is a monotonically decreasing function
of Pi, and IBi(∆i (1− pi)) = 0. Consequently, the privacy-
power function for the binary model for a single user is given
by
IBi(Pi) = (IBi (Pi))
+
, (11)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0).
By particularizing (9) with IXi(Pi) = IBi(Pi) for all i,
and solving the resultant problem, we find the optimal power
allocation P ∗i as
P ∗i =
{
∆ipi
1−p∆i
p∆i
if pi < p∆i,
∆i(1− pi) otherwise,
(12)
where p∆i (λ) = 1 − e−λ∆i , and λ is chosen such that∑N
i=1 P
∗
i = P . Note that p∆i satisfies 0 ≤ p∆i ≤ 1. Then, the
privacy-power function for the multiple users with independent
binary input load distributions is given by
IB(P ) =
N∑
i=1
IBi(P
∗
i ), (13)
=
N∑
i=1
(
HB(pi)−
pi
p∆i
HB(p∆i)
)+
, (14)
where HB(p) denotes the entropy of a Ber(p) distribution.
Each user can achieve full privacy IBi(P ∗i ) = 0 by
obtaining an average power of PXi − Li = ∆i(1 − pi) from
the AES, the remaining power Li is obtained from the grid
without incurring any lost of privacy. However, if the average
power obtained from the AES is below PXi − Li then the
energy obtained from the grid comes at the expense of a
loss in privacy. Note that P ∗i and IB(P ) depend on the input
load parameters PXi , Li, ∆i, and pi in a non-straightforward
manner. We postpone the detailed analysis of this privacy-
power function to Section V.
IV. CONTINUOUS INPUT LOADS
For continuous input loads, the optimal output alphabet
is also continuous. Consequently, efficient algorithms, such
as the BA algorithm, do not yield the optimal solution to
(5). In this case, we provide a lower bound on the privacy-
power function by using the Shannon lower bound. We then
show that this lower bound is achievable when the users have
independent exponentially distributed input loads.
Using the SLB [19], for any input load distribution, we have
IXi(Pi) ≥ (h(Xi)− ln (Pi))
+
nats, (15)
where h(X) denotes the differential entropy of the continuous
random variable X . Observe that,
I(Xi, Yi) = h(Xi)− h(Xi|Yi), (16a)
= h(Xi)− h(Xi − Yi|Yi), (16b)
≥ h(Xi)− h(Xi − Yi), (16c)
≥ h(Xi)− h(Exp(E [Xi − Yi])), (16d)
= h(Xi)− ln (Pi) , (16e)
where we have used Exp(λ) to denote an exponential random
variable with mean λ. In the above chain of inequalities, (16c)
follows as conditioning reduces entropy, and (16d) follows
since exponential distribution maximizes the entropy among
all nonnegative distributions with a given mean value [19].
Next, we present the necessary and sufficient conditions
for any piecewise continuous input load distribution fX(x)
to achieve the SLB, together with the conditional probability
distribution fY |X(y|x) achieving it. We denote by u(x), the
unit step function which assigns 0 for x < 0, and 1 for x ≥ 0.
The Dirac delta function is denoted by δ(x). We use f ′(x) to
denote the first order derivative of f(x) and f(x+i ) = lim
x→x+
i
f(x) and f(x−i ) = lim
x→x−
i
f(x) and x → x+i and x → x
−
i
mean that x→ xi from the left and right, respectively. Finally,
we define ∆f (xi) = f(x+i )− f(x
−
i ).
Theorem 3: Suppose that the input load distribution fX(x)
is continuous on R+ except for a countable number of
jump discontinuities or non-differentiable points XD =
{x1, ..., xD}. Then, the SLB (15) is achieved for all P
satisfying gY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ R+, where
gY (y) = gYC (y) + gYD(y) (17)
is a mixture of a continuous and a discrete functions specific
as follows:
gYC (y) = fX(y) + E[V ]f
′
X(y), y ∈ R+/XD,
gYD (y) = E[V ]
D∑
i=0
∆X(xi)δ(y − xi), y ∈ XD.
For all P , at which the SLB is achieved, the output distribution
is given by fY (y) = gY (y) and the optimal conditional output
load distribution reads fY |X(y|x) = fV (x − y) fY (y)fX (x) where
fV (v) =
1
E[V ]e
− v
E[V ]u(v).
Proof: To show this results, we need to find the con-
ditional distribution fY |X(y|x) that satisfies the SLB with
equality [19]. We require the random variables V = X − Y
and Y to be independent, and V to be distributed according
to an exponential distribution V ∼ Exp(P ) with mean P .
We first obtain the output distribution fY (y) from its Laplace
transform LfY (s) = L(fY (y))(s) as
LfY (s) =
LfX(s)
LfV (s)
,
= LfX(s) (1 + E[V ]s) .
Then, it follows that fY (y) is given by (17). The condi-
tional distribution fY |X(y|x) is obtained using the fact that
fX|Y (x|y) = fV (x − y). Finally, it can be shown that∫∞
0
fY (y)dy = 1; and thus, the achievability is guaranteed
7λ1
λ2
λ3
λ
Fig. 2. The reverse waterfilling solution for the optimal power provided to
each user from the AES.
by requiring fY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ R+.
Remark 3.1: If the achievability condition in Theorem 3 is
satisfied for a given Pmax, it is satisfied at any P ≤ Pmax.
Then it follows that, there is a unique critical average power
level, P0, such that IX(P ) = h(X) − ln (P ) for all P ≤ P0
and IX(P ) > h(X)− ln (P ) for all P > P0.
To find a lowerbound on the privacy-power function in the
case of multiple users with continuous input load distributions,
we replace IXi(Pi) with (h(Xi)− ln (Pi))
+ in (9), and find
the corresponding optimal power allocation P ∗i as
P ∗i =
{
λ, if eh(Xi) > λ,
e h(Xi), otherwise, (18)
where λ is chosen such that
∑N
i=1 P
∗
i = P . Then the privacy-
power function for multiple users can be lower-bounded by
IX(P ) ≥
N∑
i=1
(h(Xi)− ln (λ))
+
nats. (19)
A. Exponential Input Loads
For an exponential input load distribution with mean λi,
i.e., Xi ∼ Exp (λi), the SLB in (15) is achievable by using
the conditional distribution [18]
fYi|Xi (y|x) =
λi
Pi
e
− (x−y)
P
i e
x
λi fYi(y),
where fYi is a mixture of a continuous and a discrete distri-
bution specified by
fYi(y) =
(
1−
P
i
λi
)
1
λi
e
− y
λi +
P
i
λi
δ(y).
Then the privacy-power function for a single user with an
exponential input load with mean λi can be explicitly charac-
terized as follows:
IEi(Pi) =
{
ln
(
λi
Pi
)
, if Pi ≤ λi,
0, otherwise.
(20)
By particularizing (9) with IXi(Pi) = IEi(Pi) for all i,
and solving the resultant problem, we find the optimal AES
power allocation among users, P ∗i , as the well-known reverse
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Fig. 3. Privacy-power function for a binary input-output system with different
p values.
waterfilling solution
P ∗i =
{
λ, if λ < λi,
λi, if λ ≥ λi,
where λ is chosen such that
∑N
i=1 P
∗
i
= P .
The reverse waterfilling power allocation is illustrated in
Fig. 2 for three users with independent exponentially dis-
tributed energy demands with means λ1, λ2, and λ3, respec-
tively. The optimal reverse water level is given by λ, where
the height of the shaded areas in the figure correspond to the
average AES power allocated to each user. We observe that
the optimal energy management policy satisfies all the energy
demands of the users whose average input load is below λ,
directly from the AES. Hence, no information is leaked to the
UP about the energy consumption of these users; user 1 and
user 3 in the figure. The rest of the users receive exactly the
same amount of power λ from the AES, and the remainder of
their energy demand is satisfied from the grid. Finally, the
privacy-power function for multiple users with exponential
input loads can be expressed as
IE(P ) =
N∑
i=1
(
ln
(
λi
λ
))+
. (21)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we numerically analyze the privacy-power
function in a SM system with various input load distributions
and number of users, by explicitly evaluating the information
theoretic optimal leakage rate expressions.
A. Single User Scenario
In order to illustrate the behaviour of the privacy-power
function for a simple binary input load system, we first
consider a single user with an input load alphabet X = Y =
{0, 1}, and pX(0) = p. We plot the I(P ) function for the
binary input load in Fig. 3 for different p values. As expected,
the required average power from the AES is maximum when
the user wants perfect privacy, and it is zero when no privacy
is required. We also observe clearly that the privacy-power
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AES power P for binary input loads.
function is decreasing in p and convex. Another interesting
observation from the figure is the fact that the I(P ) curves for
two different input load distributions, i.e., different p values,
might intersect. This means that, to achieve the same level
of privacy a lighter input load might require lower or higher
average power than a heavier input load. Also note that the
two different input load distributions, say p = 0.1 and p = 0.9,
have the same level of privacy when there is no AES in the
system; however, the input load with lower average energy
demand, i.e., the one with p = 0.9, achieves perfect privacy
with a much lower P value.
Next, we use the discrete uniform distribution to compare
the privacy protection achieved by the information theoretical
optimal policy derived here, with different heuristic policies.
In this case, the input load has a uniform distribution U(x)
with input load alphabet X = {0, c, 2c, ..., (N − 1)c}, where
c = 2
N−1 is a constant used to impose a mean value of
E[X ] = 1. Based on Theorem 2, the output load alphabet
can be limited to X as well without loss of optimality. We
set N = 21 and in Fig. 4 we plot the privacy-power function
for the optimal strategy obtained by using the BA Algorithm
together with the privacy-power functions of the following two
heuristic strategies:
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AES power P for binary input loads
Time Division: In this case, at each time instant, the EMU
gets all the energy needed by the user, either from the AES
or from the grid, but not from both simultaneously. Then, to
satisfy the average power constraint at the AES, the EMU
obtains energy from the AES with probability P
E[X] . The
information leaked to the UP, is thus given by
I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y = 0)
P
E[X ]
−H(X |Y = x)
(
1−
P
E[X ]
)
,
= log2(N)
(
1−
P
E[X ]
)
.
Limit Maximum Output Load: In this case, we use the
AES to limit the maximum energy that we get from the grid.
At each time instant, we get all the energy from the grid
X(t) = Y (t) if X(t) < kc, whereas if X(t) ≥ kc we get
Y (t) = kc from the grid and the remaining energy is taken
from the AES. In this case, for each k = 0, ..., N − 1, the
average power requested from the AES is given by
P = (N − 1− k) (N − k)
c
2N
and the information leaked to the UP is
I(X ;Y ) = H(X)− Pr(Y = kc)H(X |Y = kc),
= log2(N)−
N − k
2N
log2(N − k).
In Fig. 4, we can observe that given an average power limited
AES, the optimal EMU policy derived by this information
theoretic framework attains much better privacy protection,
than the simple heuristic algorithms described here.
B. Multiple Users Scenario
Next we consider a multi-user scenario with N = 3 users.
We assume equal binary load levels Hi = 1 and Li = 0, but
different average energy demands with p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.5,
and p3 = 0.1; thus we have PX1 = 0.1, PX2 = 0.5, PX3 =
0.9. Fig. 6 illustrates the privacy for each user IBi(P ∗i ) as a
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Fig. 7. I(P ) with respect to the average AES power P for binary input
loads with different number of users.
function of the average power P available at the AES. Notice
that, although users 1 and 3, in the absence of an AES, leak
the same amount of information to the UP since HB(0.1) =
HB(0.9), User 1 achieves perfect privacy much more rapidly
as the average energy demand of this user is much lower. Also
note that, user 3 achieves perfect privacy for a much higher
value of P , even compared to user 2, which leaks the highest
amount of information when there is no AES, as it has the
highest entropy.
Remember that, as opposed to the exponential input load
scenario, in the binary case, the privacy-power function
IBi(P
∗
i ) for each user does not depend solely on the average
power demand of the user, but on both of the parameters
∆i and pi. To illustrate this dependence, we consider a
scenario again with N = 3 users, but with equal average
power demands PXi = ∆i (1− pi), while Li = 0 for all
i. We choose different parameters ∆i and pi for each user.
Fig. 6 shows the privacy achieved by each user, IBi(P ∗i ),
as a function of the average power P available at the AES.
Observe that the optimal power allocation quickly reduces the
information leaked by user 2, and achieves perfect privacy
for this user much before the other two, although this is the
user leaking the most amount of information in the absence
of an AES. The input power loads for users 1 and 3 have
equal entropy, but with different behaviours; user 1 demands
large amounts of energy but very rarely, while user 3 demands
low amounts of energy very frequently. The optimal EMU
policy seen by these users also differs significantly. While for
user 1 the privacy-power function is a concave monotonically
decreasing function, for user 3 the privacy-power function is
monotonically decreasing but piecewise convex.
Next, we study the effect of the number of users on the
privacy-power function. In Fig. 7, we depict the optimal
information leakage rate with respect to the available average
AES power for binary input loads with different number of
users N = {1, 2, 3}. We can observe that with more than one
users, we have different regimes of operation corresponding
to the number of users that receive energy from the grid.
Similarly, in Fig. 8 we consider the scenario with exponential
input loads. In both models, regardless of the number of users
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
 
 
Exp. N=1, λ1=1
Exp. N=2, λ1=1/8, λ2=7/8
Exp. N=3, λ1=1/24, λ2=8/24,λ3=13/24
I
(P
)
bi
ts
P
Fig. 8. I(P ) with respect to the average AES power P for exponential
input loads with different number of users.
in the system the total average power consumed by the users
is fixed to PX . In the figures we set PX = 1. As expected,
if the average power provided by the AES is equal to the
total average power demanded by the users, perfect privacy
can be achieved since no energy is requested from the UP.
Instead, as the average power of the AES goes to zero, all the
information is revealed to the UP, and thus, the information
leakage rate is equal to the sum of the entropies of all the
input loads. In between these two extremes the privacy-power
function exhibits a monotone decreasing convex behaviour,
and the information leakage rate increases with the number of
users in the system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced and studied the privacy-power function,
I(P ), which characterizes the achievable information theoretic
privacy in a multi-user SM system in the presence of an AES.
We have provided a single-letter information theoretic charac-
terization for I(P ), and showed that it can be evaluated numer-
ically when the input loads are discrete. We have also provided
explicit characterization of the privacy-power function in the
case of binary and exponential input load distributions. We
have shown that the optimal allocation of the energy provided
by the AES in the exponentially distributed input load scenario
can be derived using the reverse waterfilling algorithm, which
resembles the rate-distortion function for multiple Gaussian
sources.
We believe that the proposed information theoretic frame-
work for privacy in SM systems provides valuable tools
to identify the fundamental challenges and limits for this
critical problem, whose importance will only increase as SM
adoption becomes more widespread. Many interesting research
problems implore further studies, including time correlated
input loads, systems with multiple EMUs, as well as cost and
pricing issues considering dynamic pricing over time.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Wunderlich, D. Veit, and S. Sarker, “Adoption of information systems
in the electricity sector: The issue of smart metering,” in Proc. Americas
Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, WA, Aug 2012.
10
[2] “Directive 2009/72/ec of the european parliament and of the council
of 13 july 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity and repealing directive 2003/54/ec,” Official Journal of the
Eureopean Union, vol. 46, no. L 211, pp. 55–93, 14 Aug. 2009.
[3] P. McDaniel and S. McLaughlin, “Security and privacy challenges in the
smart grid,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 75–77, May-Jun.
2009.
[4] A. Predunzi, “A neuron nets based procedure for identifying domestic
appliances pattern-of-use from energy recordings at meter panel,” in
Proc. IEEE Power Eng. Society Winter Meeting, New York, Jan. 2002.
[5] U. Greveler, B. Justus, and D. Loehr, “Multimedia content identification
through smart meter power usage profiles,” in Computers, Privacy and
Data Protection (CPDP), Brussels, Belgium, Jan. 2012.
[6] C. Efthymiou and G. Kalogridis, “Smart grid privacy via anonymization
of smart metering data,” in Proc. IEEE Int’l Conf. Smart Grid Comm.,
Gaithersburg, MD, Oct. 2010.
[7] J.-M. Bohli, C. Sorge, and O. Ugus, “A privacy model for smart
metering,” in IEEE ICC, Capetown, South Africa, May 2010.
[8] S. Wang, L. Cui, J. Que, D. Choi, X. Jiang, S. Cheng, and L. Xie,
“A randomized response model for privacy preserving smart metering,”
IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1317–1324, Mar. 2012.
[9] L. Sankar, S. Rajagopalan, S. Mohajer, and H. Poor, “Smart meter
privacy: A theoretical framework,” Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 837–846, 2013.
[10] G. Kalogridis, C. Efthymiou, S. Denic, T. Lewis, and R. Cepeda, “Pri-
vacy for smart meters: Towards undetectable appliance load signatures,”
in IEEE Int’l Conf. Smart Grid Com., Gaithersburg, MD, Oct. 2010.
[11] D. Varodayan and A. Khisti, “Smart meter privacy using a rechargeable
battery: Minimizing the rate of information leakage,” in Proc. IEEE Int.
Conf. Acoust. Speech Sig. Proc., Prague, Czech Republic, May 2011.
[12] W. Yang, N. Li, Y. Qi, W. Qardaji, S. McLaughlin, and P. McDaniel,
“Minimizing private data disclosures in the smart grid,” in Proc. ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Raleigh, NC,
Oct. 2012.
[13] O. Tan, D. Gu¨ndu¨z, and H. V. Poor, “Increasing smart meter privacy
through energy harvesting and storage devices,” IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications: Smart Grid Communications, vol. 7,
no. 31, pp. 1331–1341, Jul. 2013.
[14] D. Gunduz and J. Gomez-Vilardebo, “Smart meter privacy in the
presence of an alternative energy source,” in Proc. IEEE Int’l Conf.
on Comm., Budapest, Hungary, June 2013.
[15] D. Agrawal and C. C. Aggarwal, “On the design and quantification
of privacy preserving data mining algorithms,” in Proc. Symposium on
Principles of Database Systems, Santa Barbara, CA, May 2001.
[16] D. Rebollo-Monedero and J. D.-F. J. Forne´, “From t-closeness-like
privacy to postrandomization via information theory,” IEEE Trans.
Knowl., Data Eng., vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 1623–1636, Nov. 2010.
[17] L. Sankar, S. Rajagopalan, and H. Poor, “Utility-privacy tradeoffs in
databases: An information-theoretic approach,” Information Forensics
and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 838–852, June
2013.
[18] J. Gomez-Vilardebo and D. Gunduz, “Privacy of smart meter systems
with an alternative energy source,” in IEEE Int’l Sym. Inform. Theory,
Istanbul, Turkey, Jul. 2013.
[19] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. Wiley-
Interscience, 1991.
